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Recent media coverage of the threatened collapse of the
vast Wilkins ice shelf highlights the manner in which
the established focus on global warming and the ozone
hole has led Antarctica to be well and truly accepted as
playing an integral role in global environmental systems.
By contrast, histories of the 1950 and 1960s continue
still to treat Antarctica largely as, to quote Philip Quigg
(1983), ‘a Pole Apart’, that is a marginal region struggling
for inclusion on most world maps. Despite the occasional
newsworthy item, like the 1952 Anglo-Argentine clash
at Hope Bay (Beck 1987: 18–21) or the 1955–1958
British Trans-Antarctic Expedition (Fuchs and Hillary
1958), Antarctic affairs have not been regarded, except
perhaps in Argentina, Australia, Chile and New Zealand,
as sufficiently mainstream during the 1950s and 1960s to
warrant inclusion in national or global histories covering
that period. As a result, it remains easy still to gloss over
the 1959 Antarctic Treaty as possessing rather limited
contemporary significance, and hence to dismiss it as
a limited purpose agreement confined to a relatively
marginal area. Indeed, for some commentators, the treaty
was even interpreted as a lost opportunity in terms of
failing either to internationalise the region or to resolve
the longstanding Antarctic sovereignty problem.
In reality, the Antarctic Treaty, signed by twelve
governments at Washington on 1 December 1959, can
be properly understood only if viewed in the broader
post-1945 cold war context. Apart from providing the
fundamental postwar framework for international affairs,
this east-west conflict escalated beyond Europe to cover
other parts of the world, not excluding the vast cold
continent of Antarctica. Indeed, during the 1950s the
leading powers feared that Antarctica was gradually being
drawn into this broader conflict. For example, in July 1959
Henry Dater of the USA’s State Department asserted that:
Because of its position of leadership in the Free World,
it is evident that the United States could not now
withdraw from the Antarctic . . . . National prestige
has been committed . . . . Our capacity for sustaining
and leading an international endeavour there that
will benefit all mankind is being watched not only
by those nations with us in the Antarctic but also
by non−committed nations everywhere. Antarctica
simply cannot be separated from the global matrix.
Science is the shield behind which these activities are
carried out [author’s italics] (Beck 1986: 64–65).
References to, the ‘Free World’, ‘with us’, ‘the global
matrix’, ‘non-committed’ and ‘the shield’ offer revealing
insights into American official thinking at a time when
sections of the American media were speculating about
the, to quote the title of an article published in June 1959
and found in US government archives, ‘Red threat from
Antarctica’ (Missiles and Rockets: Magazine of World
Astronautics 1959: 15–16). In October 1959 worries about
Soviet intentions led The New York Times to use the
opening of the Antarctic treaty negotiations at Washington
DC to stress that ‘it is in our interest to insure that this
vast region should never be turned by the Russians into
a kind of Antarctic Albania . . . . Launching pads could
be used by the USSR to blackmail the entire Southern
Hemisphere from here’ (The New York Times 26 October
1959).
Of course, military experts might argue that such
picturesque and ‘loaded’ language displayed an ignor-
ance of both Antarctic and strategic realities, given
the restricted range and operational effectiveness of
contemporary submarines and missiles or the logistical
difficulties posed by Antarctic conditions. However, it
is worth quoting from such publications, which were
read in official circles and which in turn articulated the
assumptions underlying the thinking of many Americans.
Similar perceptions influenced official thinking in other
countries, particularly those located in the southern
hemisphere, as Harold Macmillan, the British prime
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minister, discovered in February 1958 when he visited
Australia and New Zealand. Nor was the politico-strategic
dimension irrelevant to the Soviet Union, where concerns
were articulated about the perceived threat posed by
‘western imperialists’ to Antarctic peace in general and
Soviet interests in particular (Toma 1956: 612–613).
Notwithstanding frequent references to its military
capabilities and conflict potential, in reality Antarctica’s
politico-strategic role derived less from any government’s
concern to militarise or nuclearise the region but more
from a desire to deny an advantage to a rival power
bloc. In this sense, the continent possessed essentially
a negative strategic utility, which proved a function of
what might happen in the long term rather than of what
had actually happened already. This aspect was reinforced
by the long standing sovereignty issue, given the manner
in which seven rival, occasionally overlapping, territorial
claims (but there was some mutual recognition however),
prompted tensions and occasional incidents. The refusal
of the two superpowers to recognise existing claims
merely complicated the problem. Looking back to the
late 1950s, John Heap, who worked in the Polar Regions
section of the British Foreign Office for nearly thirty
years, pointed to the ‘fear of chaos’ over claims as a
principal factor prompting the treaty’s conclusion (Heap
1983: 105). For Heap, the treaty’s benefits in the form
of peaceful use and scientific cooperation, as pressed in
the international media, ‘should lead no one to believe
that such altruism was in the minds of the negotiators; it
was not. The parties gained little from it but what they
all variously stood to lose without it made the exercise
worthwhile’. In brief, the continuation of the demilitarised
and denuclearised status of Antarctica, in conjunction
with the shelving of sovereignty disputes, represented the
basic raison d’eˆtre of the treaty.
The success of the 1959 Washington Conference
was facilitated by what Vasili Kuznetsov (1960: 23),
the Soviet delegate, described as ‘favourable conditions’,
most notably by the cooperative framework provided by
the Antarctic programme of International Geophysical
Year (IGY) and the improvement in east-west relations
signalled by recent progress in the Geneva nuclear
weapons talks and the visit made in September 1959
to the USA by Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader. In
retrospect, it was perhaps fortunate that the treaty was
concluded some five months before the serious Soviet-
American rift consequent upon the U-2 spy plane affair
as well as the serious crises centred upon Berlin and Cuba
during the early 1960s.
Welcoming its conclusion, in December 1959 Sir Har-
old Caccia, the British ambassador in Washington, pressed
the case for viewing the treaty’s broader significance:
The problems of this remote and unpeopled region
might be thought to be of little relevance to the great
issues that concern the world today. But they are
problems to which the 12 nations represented here
have attached importance and which have created
real difficulties for some of them. It is our hope
that the successful conclusion of this treaty will be a
good omen and will contribute to the establishment
of a climate more favourable to the settlement of
other international questions. In that case, the treaty
will have had an importance far transcending the
Antarctica (The Times (London) 2 December 1959).
Despite being treated in both the contemporary press
and present day histories of the period as a region ‘of
little relevance to the great issues that concern the world
today’, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty represented a substantial
international achievement, as suggested by the manner in
which it resulted from a lengthy and difficult series of
secret meetings conducted by a working group (1958–
1959) and the six week Washington Conference (Dodds
2007: 57–60). Quite apart from its novel, even precedent-
setting, features relating to peaceful use and conflict
management, the agreement was signed by both the
American and Soviet governments. Indeed, The Guardian
(2 December 1959) claimed that this was the first time
that the Soviet Union had joined western governments
in such an agreement since the start of the cold war.
The inclusion of the seven claimant governments was
also important in enabling the future containment of the
tricky sovereignty issue. Unsurprisingly, in January 1960
the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists presented the year
as marking ‘the Dawn of a New Decade’ (Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists 1960: 3). Since 1947 this journal
had used a so called ‘clock of doom’ to remind readers
about the fearful destruction implicit in the development
of atomic and nuclear weapons. Initially, the time was
set at eight minutes to midnight, but subsequently the
minute hand was advanced to two minutes to midnight
in the light of advances in nuclear weapons technology.
However, in January 1960 the clock was reversed for
the first time, when the hands were put back to seven
minutes to midnight because, the journal asserted, of
the signature of the Antarctic Treaty, Khrushchev’s visit
to the USA, and the initiation of the Geneva test ban
talks.
In effect, the Antarctic Treaty created a ‘continent for
peace’ through provisions for demilitarisation, a nuclear
weapons free zone, inspection, the suspension of sover-
eignty disputes, and international scientific cooperation.
Moreover, it provided the basis for the establishment of
the Antarctic Treaty system as a management regime.
Following ratification by all signatories, the Antarctic
Treaty came into effect in June 1961. Soon afterwards,
in August 1961, The Economist (1961: 554) welcomed
the creation of a twelve nation ‘peace club’ for a region,
wherein ‘nobody can be quite sure what future pitfalls
need to be guarded against’.
A continent wholly demilitarised and open to unlim-
ited inspection: this is not Utopia, but Antarctica as
proposed by the Antarctic Treaty, to which twelve
governments have subscribed. There, at the bottom
of the world, an ice locked, blizzard wracked region,
bigger by a half than Europe, has been marked as
a peace preserve. Peace for scientists and explorers,
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peace for penguins, the only permanent residents; no
military bases or stores, no rocket launching sites
and no nuclear explosions are to sully its unplumbed
whiteness. The treaty is . . . the first truly self denying
ordinance to be signed by, among others, all the
nuclear powers.
At a time when we are celebrating the fiftieth
anniversary of the treaty’s signature, it is worth noting
the way in which many commentators, including those
who should have known better, came to assume that the
treaty had a fixed thirty year duration. During the late
1970s and throughout the 1980s, this proved one of the
most common points raised in questions at the end of
any talk delivered by me on Antarctica, given the manner
in which 1991 came to be viewed by many people as
a critical date marking the end of the treaty. In part,
this view was encouraged by initial press reports of the
treaty’s signature. Thus, The Times (2 December 1959)
report was headlined ‘Peaceful cooperation in Antarctica
for 30 years’: ‘The treaty runs for 30 years, after which it
will be reviewed’. Subsequently, ‘reviewed’, most notably
the provisions allowing for a review conference ‘after
the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry
into force of the present Treaty’ (article XII), came to
be interpreted as ‘terminated’. Writing during the early
1970s Paul Daniels (1973: 44–45), a leading actor in the
treaty negotiations, stated that ‘the Treaty is to remain in
effect for 30 years from the date of its entry into force on
June 23 1961’. Soon afterwards, this line was echoed by
Malcolm Booker, an Australian diplomat involved in the
actual negotiations, who asserted that ‘the treaty expires in
1991’ (Booker 1978: 116). Nor did The Times avoid such
errors, as highlighted in January 1983 when an editorial
commenting on Margaret Thatcher’s visit to the Falklands
referred to Antarctica, ‘whose Treaty is to be renewed
in six years’ time’ (The Times (London) 10 January
1983). Thus, The Times committed a double mistake in
respect not only to the matter of renewal but also to the
irrelevance of the year 1989, even in the sphere of treaty
review.
In reality, as events proved, the position was somewhat
different. Lacking a specified duration, the treaty could
last indefinitely without any need for renewal or re-
negotiation, let alone review. Significantly, the preamble
employs the word ‘forever’ in regard to the treaty’s
objectives: ‘it is in the interests of mankind that Antarctica
shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes’. Appreciating the national and international
benefits accruing from the preservation of the 1959 treaty,
most notably the ATS, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Parties (ATCPs) came increasingly to regard the treaty as
a long term obligation extending into the indefinite future.
Far from resulting in the expiry, let alone the review, of
the treaty, 1991 was used by ATCPs to issue a celebratory
declaration to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the ‘out-
standingly successful’ Antarctic Treaty: ‘The Antarctic
Treaty Parties are proud of their achievements over the
last 30 years and the example of peaceful cooperation
that the Treaty provides to the rest of the world’ (ATCM
1991: 139). This sense of achievement and durability
was reinforced by the almost simultaneous conclusion of
negotiations for the comprehensive environmental protec-
tion regime embodied in the Protocol on Environmental
Protection.
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty embodied both static and
dynamic qualities, and this combination has enabled
ATCPs not only to preserve Antarctica as a continent
for peace but also to accommodate the ATS to a fast
changing world. The ATS’s responsibilities have been
extended into new areas, most notably environmental
protection and living resource management. Membership
has expanded, while ATCPs have sought to ensure that
the ATS has responded effectively to external challenges
to the regime’s validity and international acceptability
(Beck 2004). Hitherto, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty has
been largely ignored by history books. Hopefully the
role of the Antarctic Treaty system in managing the
treaty regime, preserving the peace of Antarctica, and
protecting its environment during the past half century
or so will find a much deserved place in future history
books.
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The Antarctic Treaty was adopted by twelve nations in
Washington, DC on 1 December 1959 with the interests
of science and the progress of all mankind. Seven of
these nations asserted territorial claims, including the
overlapping claims of Argentina, Chile and the United
Kingdom in the Antarctic Peninsula. The five other
nations were non-claimants, including the United States
and Soviet Union (now Russian Federation), which
reserved rights to press claims in the future.
What compelled these nations to adopt the Antarctic
Treaty and to establish the first institution to manage an
international space beyond national jurisdictions? Why
has the Antarctic Treaty succeeded in managing nearly
ten percent of the Earth, for peaceful purposes only,
continuously over the past half century? What are the
‘common interests’ of nations in the Antarctic?
Consider the situation in the 1950’s. Antarctica could
easily have become a region for testing or storing
weapons, including nuclear weapons that existed in the
United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom. There
were no native human inhabitants to object and Antarctica
itself was a frozen desert, isolated at the southern end of
the Earth surrounded by a vast ocean. Yet, Antarctica
became the first nuclear-free zone on Earth where all
activities of a military nature have been prohibited, except
the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific
research or for any other peaceful purpose.
The Antarctic Treaty is elegant in its simplicity;
only requiring fourteen articles for its firm foundation
to manage the region south of 60◦S in the interests of all
mankind ‘for ever.’ This agreement established a bridge
of cooperation between the two superpowers and 10
other states on the basis of science, as kindled by the
International Geophysical Year (IGY).
Established territorial adversaries such as Argentina,
Chile and the United Kingdom agreed in Article IV
of the Antarctic Treaty that no acts or activities shall
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a
claim while the Antarctic Treaty is in force. Open and
unfettered inspection was enabled by Article VII in all
areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations,
and equipment. Bolstered by the freedom of scientific in-
vestigation and international cooperation through science,
as provided in Arcticles II and III, the Antarctic Treaty
created a framework for stewardship of an entire continent
and its surrounding ocean in the interests of all mankind.
There was no ‘magic bullet’ in the Antarctic Treaty
that at once solved problems for ever. Rather, the unique
step that mankind made with the Antarctic Treaty was the
establishment of an evolving process of consultation for
nations continuously to adjust their solutions in relation to
ever changing circumstances. As Article IX.1of the Treaty
noted:
Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in
the preamble to the present Treaty shall meet at
the City of Canberra within two months after date
of entry into force of the Treaty, and thereafter
at suitable intervals and places, for the purpose
of exchanging information, consulting together on
matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica,
and formulating and considering, and recommending
to their Governments, measures in furtherance of
the principles and objectives of the Treaty including
measures regarding:
A use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only;
B facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica;
C facilitation of international scientific cooperation
in Antarctica;
D facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspec-
tion provided for in Article VII of the Treaty;
E questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in
Antarctica;
F preservation and conservation of living resources
in Antarctica.
This consultative process was set in motion by
President D. Eisenhower on 3 May 1958, when he invited
all nations engaged in scientific activities in Antarctica
during IGY to develop an administrative arrangement
dedicated to the principle that the vast uninhabited wastes
of Antarctica shall be used only for peaceful purposes.
Over the next eighteen months, sixty secret meetings were
held in the United States. Inclusion of the Soviet Union in
these secret meetings is noteworthy, particularly because
Eisenhower had to prevail over objections from his joint
chiefs of staff. Without the Soviet Union, however, it is
extremely unlikely that the Antarctic Treaty would have
secured the kind of legitimacy and robustness that we have
witnessed over the past half century.
Finally, on 15 October 1959, the conference on
Antarctica was formally initiated in Washington, DC
